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Abstract
Aim: This article presents a theoretical model that enables achievement of macroeconomic 
efficiency of the legal aid system by means of adjusting supply to the pre-determined de-
mand.
Results: Main deterministic components of aggregate demand for legal aid are defined 
using a shift-share type framework. The knowledge of its parameters makes it possible 
to estimate expected demand for legal aid in response to various formulae of possible re-
forms of the system.
Motivation: Estimates of demand serve to compute legal aid supply that minimizes social 
costs of legal aid provision. This task is accomplished by means of the so called assignment 
problem originating the field of operational research. Providers are divided in line with 
their average productivities in solving appropriate legal cases and the aggregate personal 
costs of legal aid provision are subject to minimization.
Keywords: publicly provided goods; legal aid; supply and demand for legal aid; determinants 
of demand for legal aid; assignment problem; cost minimization
JEL: C29; C53; C61; H44; H50; K20; L51
1. Introduction
Common access to legal aid is a prerequisite of citizens’ empowerment and their 
actual equity of opportunity. In most states belonging to the western culture 
there function institutionalized systems of legal aid for those in need. Yet, up 
to the present the problems of legal aid seem not to have been satisfactorily cov-
ered by law and economics (Winczorek, 2012, pp. 41–103). Apparently, to some 
extent this might be attributed to insufficient recognition of the quantitative as-
pects of the problem, in particular to lack of solid estimates of full demand for 
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legal aid1 and of scientific procedures of balancing supply with the actual de-
mand. Possibly, this state of affairs might have resulted in aborting many legis-
lative initiatives in the field under consideration, as was e.g. in the case of Poland 
(Bojarski, 2012).
In the present article an attempt has been made to construct a model ex-
plaining demand for legal aid in order to determine adequate supply under 
macroeconomic efficiency. With a help of an original, shift-share like, de-
terministic model, main mechanisms were identified that generate aggregate 
demand and a decision tree was suggested that enables elaboration of variants 
of the total demand size in response to changes in suitable parameters of the de-
terministic model.
The article structure is as follows. Section 1 is devoted to general consider-
ations on demand, supply and efficiency under particular market conditions, 
where payees receive the legal services free of charge. Its contents enables better 
understanding of the filling of section 2, where a novel decomposition of key 
determinants of demand for legal help has been described. Apart from the pres-
entation of a formal model, by means of which one can estimate and forecast to-
tal demand for legal aid, some commentary follows on possible factors affecting 
respective components of the decomposition.
Estimates of the total demand are binding for fixing total supply of legal 
aid. This is, however, a necessary but insufficient condition of macroeconomic 
efficiency. It is only when the balancing is achieved at the lowest social costs 
that one can speak in terms of the efficiency. This problem constitutes subject 
of considerations in section 3. Finally section 4 concludes.
2. The current state of knowledge in the filed of demand, 
supply and efficiency of legal aid
A key macroeconomic issue of legal aid is estimating expected demand on the side 
of payees and determining size and structure of the balancing supply. It be-
hooves us to mention, however, that unconditional usage of the term ‘demand’ 
is a slight misuse in this context. This is so because demand and supply are inex-
tricably linked to a third term, being prices that clear up the market.
In contrast to demand for free material and storable commodities distributed 
free of charge, demand for free legal aid is upper limited since the upper limit 
is constrained by individual needs. Consequently, the term ‘demand’ is in this 
context tantamount to the term ‘need’. This clarification notwithstanding, esti-
1 According to specialist nomenclature legal aid can be decomposed into the following 
forms of activity: legal information, legal aid, civil aid, and additional services (DPP MPiPS 
et al., 2013). In practice, distinguishing between these forms might be a tall order, which 
explains why investigations into demand and supply of legal aid do not explicitly discrim-
inate between them (Burdziej & Dudkiewicz, 2013; Preisert et al., 2013). Consequently, 
in the text to follow the term legal aid implicitly includes all the afore-mentioned forms 
of activity.
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mation of aggregate demand2 and determination of its main driving factors re-
mains a crucial task.
It is not a simple research question. One cannot benefit here from data 
on the commercial legal advice market, as the needs of the would-be payees 
of the legal aid system are insufficiently satisfied by the commercial market. 
That is why it is necessary to carry out an adequate, national representative sur-
vey, by means of which it could be possible to estimate variants of demand with 
response to various decision parameters. One must, however, mention that 
such a survey — irrespective of its adequacy and advancement — would enable 
diagnosis of the present state of affairs in the field of legal aid at a given moment 
only. Yet, information contained in responses to suitably filtered questionnaire 
queries can be helpful while estimating expected demand after introducing 
far-reaching institutional changes to the present legal aid system, too.
There are three factors that should be regarded as crucial in the estimation. 
These are (Araszkiewicz, 2012, pp. 250–255; Curran & Noone, 2007, pp. 63–
89; Access to Justice Taskforce, Attorney-General’s Department, 2009):
 – intuition of law (a poor substitute of the sense of law) of the payees;
 – awareness of the access privilege;
 – actual, locomotion access to legal aid.
In contrast to inferior needs, inherent to the biology of man, a need to benefit 
from legal advice calls for some intuition of law as a binding institution regulating 
weighty human relations. Yet, it is not about the sense of law but about some-
thing much narrower: things like guess/suspicion on the side of the would-be 
payee that a given problem could be solved in the legal course, which is a must 
to:
 – articulate the need (affirmative response to a question on the occurrence 
of a legal case);
 – make an attempt to solve the problem (e.g. via searching for legal advice).
Although the intuition of law seems a trivial requirement, it not so obvious 
that this knowledge is common, especially that a large share of the would-be 
payees are socially excluded. Besides, it seems reasonable to assume that a tar-
geted mass advertising campaign could result in a significant increase in the in-
tuition of law and awareness of the access privilege. However, while in the case 
of the access privilege it is possible (see further on) to elaborate procedures en-
abling estimation of the upper limits of demand, it remains highly unknown 
how this intuition can be affected by the form of an institutionalized reform 
of the legal aid system3.
2 From the viewpoint of terminology correctness one should use the term ‘need’ rather 
than ‘demand’. Yet, in view of the problems tackled in the article these two are equivalent, 
and as the latter rather than the former seems to prevail in the literature, it is the term ‘de-
mand’ that will be consequently used throughout the text.
3 Experience of the countries with existent institutionalized systems of legal aid could 
be useful in this context. In particular, information on changes (increase) in demand for 
legal aid after the introduction of appropriate reform would be of explicit value.
  EKONOMIA I PRAWO. ECONOMICS AND LAW, 15(3): 317–334
320
Awareness of the access privilege on the side of the payees of the legal aid 
system plays the first fiddle among all possible factors influencing the total de-
mand for legal aid. Firstly, payees must be aware of this privilege to benefit 
from legal aid once a legal problem arises. Without such awareness they will 
not pay a visit to a legal clinic even if they face a legal problem. Secondly, this 
component can be capably stimulated by advertising campaigns, in which case 
one might even expect an abrupt increase in the awareness of access privilege. 
Thirdly, this category is inelastic downwards, meaning that once increased it 
cannot be fast and ready decreased because this would call for a physical obliv-
ion of this privilege on the side of the interested parties.
The intuition of law, knowledge of the access privilege, and emergence of a le-
gal problem are necessary but insufficient conditions to take advantage of legal 
aid services on the side of payees. This is so because a large share of the would-be 
payees are socially excluded and for them non-consultation costs also matter. 
That is why another factor that vitally impacts actual demand is physical/loco-
motion proximity of legal aid clinics, which is a function of their numerosity. 
Implicitly, this is the most influential agent that determines the intuition of law 
and the awareness of the access privilege in the long-run. It is thus of high im-
portance to assess — even cursorily — how introduction of a reform of the le-
gal aid system can affect total demand. Unfortunately, a reliable answer to this 
question can only be given post factum, although some conclusions in this re-
spect can be drawn on the basis of an international comparative analysis if data 
be.
As legal aid is provided free of charge, the supply of legal aid should subor-
dinate to the actual demand. A situation in which there was excess demand or 
excess supply would be by definition ineffective.
Under a simplified economic narration the supply of services for which 
providers get no gratification is null. Yet, there might be a vestigial provision 
of such services that are provided on pro publico bono basis. For obvious rea-
sons such activities cannot satisfy the actual demand, which under mentioned 
circumstances is in turn very high. Consequently, the only chance to satisfy 
the demand for free services gives a system in which providers are paid for their 
socially useful work.
Balancing supply with the actual demand is a necessary but insufficient con-
dition of macroeconomic efficiency of the legal aid system. The efficiency calls 
for fulfilment of some additional criteria in the course of introduction and func-
tioning of the system. General efficiency means realizing a given target with 
the least possible costs or getting the most possible outcome with the fixed costs 
(Black, 2008, pp. 96–97). The demand generates a pool of legal problems that 
translate into legal advice by subject layout. This demand is in turn satisfied 
by specialized legal corps. Under so defined a purpose a necessary — but in-
sufficient — condition of macroeconomic efficiency is fulfilment of the actual 
demand, which corresponds to the notion of outcome in the afore-mentioned 
definition of efficiency.
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The legal aid providers are paid for their services, which produces social 
costs of the system. Due to differences, both in education, professional spe-
cialization, and job experience, the providers differ with respect to their pro-
ductivity, which justifies differentiation in their average salaries. In effect, legal 
advice — differentiated by subject and complexity — can be supplied by various 
providers. Finally then, the problem of efficiency boils down to an optimal — 
in the sense of minimal public costs  — division of particular legal problems 
to particular legal aid providers.
Apart from personal costs of legal aid provision some other non-personal 
costs are also incurred, such as room lease, office equipment, auxiliary per-
sonnel, etc. Inclusion of such items does not impede the outlined optimization 
procedure that balances legal aid supply with the actual demand and mini-
mizes the total public costs of such provision. All of those additional costs are 
in the first place a function of the size of the legal corps, whereas the calculation 
of the costs results from technological, administration or office working stand-
ards rather than from independent economic calculation4.
3. The methodology of the research with respect to demand for 
legal aid
The methodology rests upon a shift-share framework (Florczak, 2008, pp 
21–46) in which one defines main determinants affecting a phenomenon un-
der consideration in the form of an identity. Assuming homogeneity of payees 
and of legal advice (one type of payee and one type of legal advice) the aggregate 
demand for legal aid can be expressed as follows:
,t t tBPPD LU PS×=  (1)
where:
tBPPD  — total demand (number of legal problems/cases) in year t;
tLU  — number of people eligible for legal aid in period t;
tPS  — probability (frequency) of benefiting from legal aid in period t.
In order to bring out key factors influencing the demand, formula (1) can be 
decomposed into the following parts:
,t t t t tBPPD LU SW POT MRP× × ×=  (2)
because:
1/1 / / ,/t t t t t t tBPPD LU LUS LU SPOT LUS BPPD SPOT× ×= ×  (3)
4 One can only express hope that such norms/standards are in general economically 
optimal/effective.
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where:
tSW   — awareness of the access privilege: /  t t tSW LUS LU=  (where: 
tLUS  — people with the awareness of the access privilege; tLU  — all 
eligible people);
tPOT  — need of legal aid: /t t tPOT SPOT LUS=  (where: tSPOT  — all 
cases of legal problems declared by eligible people; tLUS  — people with 
the awareness of the access privilege);
tMRP  — opportunity to satisfy the need: /t t tMRP BPPD SPOT=  (where: 
tBPPD  — all declared cases of legal aid by eligible people; tSPOT  — all 
cases of legal problems declared by eligible people);
Decompositions (2) and (3) indicate main channels influencing the demand, 
each of which of different individual, ecological or decision nature. An attempt 
to explain the demand in a dynamic manner calls for explaining dynamics 
of these factors. Effective allocation of public means to the legal aid system re-
quires continuous monitoring and forecasting of the demand. A starting point 
of such a task is identification and then quantification of factors influencing re-
spective components of relationship (2). In what follows there is an analysis 
of relevant factors.
3.1. Number of people eligible for legal aid ( LU )
The number of people entitled to legal aid ( tLU ) is a function of exogenous en-
try criteria and total population: ( ) ,  .t t tLU f entry criteria total population=
Changes in these parameters result in changes in the total number of the pay-
ees of legal aid.
At the stage of operationalization there emerge numerous problems that re-
quire arbitrary and normative solutions. The following observations are of rel-
evance here:
1. If the entry criteria are known a priori, then they determine the number 
of payees, whereas the supply should adjust to so delimited demand.
2. If the entry criteria are not set down discretionarily, then — under given 
total population — they should be selected in such a manner as to constrain 
the actual demand to the level corresponding to the actual supply, the lat-
ter being determined by available means. However, a problem arises which 
entry criteria to choose. Selecting various entry criteria one admits different 
social groups to legal aid, even if the budget constraint remains unchanged. 
That is why this variant of operationalization is more complex than the one 
that assumes an a priori knowledge of the entry criteria because it involves 
complicated and methodologically arguable comparisons of utilities of vari-
ous groups of payees.
3. One may give up balancing demand and supply but this is tantamount to for-
going macroeconomic efficiency as such a solution leads to either excess de-
mand or supply.
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4. Total number of payees should be computed on the basis of official data col-
lected by the central statistical office. One should, however, mention that 
while such data might be easily available for a given criterion, a conjunc-
tion of criteria might result in big implementation problems. Namely, it 
should not be too arduous to determine total population below a given in-
come threshold, just like e.g. number of single mothers. However, the latter 
criterion is obviously not independent of the former because a large share 
of single mothers have low income. Consequently, in the case of many diver-
sified criteria, problems of apt determination of the total population entitled 
to the legal aid are snowballing due to threats of double (triple, quadruple, 
etc.) registration. One should also stress that the lower the number of en-
try criteria and higher their legibility, the higher is the social perception 
and consent to a possible reform of the system and the more facile is its mon-
itoring. Yet, these entry criteria should be regarded as legislative parameters, 
preferably flexible enough to quickly clear up possible tensions between de-
mand and supply, if need be.
5. A practical limitation for a discretionary choice of the entry criteria is 
whether appropriate information constraining the number of payees can be 
somehow deduced from a national questionnaire of the payees of the existent 
system. This is so because if a given criterion has not been even implicitly 
considered in the questionnaire, it has no operationalization value, just for 
want of data.
3.2. Awareness of the access privilege ( SW )
This parameter seems crucial for estimation of total demand. It is inelastic down-
wards, probably being at the same time prone to a rapid rise, e.g due to a targeted 
mass media campaign. Once this awareness acquired, there will not be effective 
tools to lower it. Consequently, if demand rises rapidly, the only way to adjust it 
to the fixed supply might be narrowing the entry criteria, which obviously will 
not be met by a welcome social reception. This observation is of political rec-
ommendation: one should be quite reserved while stimulating the social aware-
ness of the access privilege, at least at the initial stage of the reform. Otherwise 
the reform might fall prey of its own success.
In the long run, beside media and advertising publicity, the awareness 
of the access privilege is a function of the following factors (Gramatnikov et al., 
2010; Access to Justice Taskforce, Attorney-General’s Department, 2009):
a. individual features (age, education, income, gender, etc.);
b. ecological conditions (e.g. place of residence);
c. cumulated number of payees that have already benefited from legal aid;
d. number of legal aid clinics (this factor is strongly related to factor c)).
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3.3. Need of legal aid, POT  its components: ,SPOT  LUS  
and actual demand, BPPD
The starting point of narration is scheme 1 (Araszkiewicz, 2012, pp. 250–255; 
Curran & Noone, 2007, pp. 63–89; Tata, 2007, pp. 489–519). The scheme 
shows all possible ways to solve (or abort) declared legal problems ( SPOT
) on the side of payees. Number of legal cases solved by legal aid providers (
BPPD  in formulas (2)–(3)) equals (see scheme 1; explanation of new symbols 
also in scheme 1):
,BPPD B SLPB D SLPBK= × + ×  (4)
where:
,SPOT A B SLPB C SLPK D SLPBK= + × + × + ×  (5)
2 2 .LUS A B C D= + + +  (6)
On the basis of questionnaire outcomes one is able to determine the actual 
demand for legal aid/advice only for investigated period. However, aptly filtered 
questions enable forecasting demand for legal services even after introduction 
of a reform. A key issue remains the awareness of access privilege and the way 
the reform is supposed to be introduced (no publicity versus a lot of it). One can 
distinguish a few variants depending on these two parameters:
1. Variant of maximum demand, in which it is assumed that due to extensive 
publicity all payees acquire knowledge of the access privilege. Moreover, 
it presumes that the future legal aid system will be typified by a dense net 
of legal clinics so that the payees will not bear high travelling costs. Under 




maxBPPD A SLPBT A SLPBT B SLPB C SLPB
C SLPBK D SLPBK
= × + × + × + ×
+ × + ×  (7)
whereas:
11 12 13 21
22 11 12 13
2 ,
maxSPOT A SLPBT A SLPBT A A SLPBT
A B SLPB C SLPB C SLPBK C SLPK
C SLPK D SLPBK
= × + × + + ×
+ + × + × + × + ×
+ × + ×  (8)
,maxLUS A B C D= + + +  (9)
because all eligible people are aware of the access privilege.
A separate commentary is necessary to explain the dam failure effect that 
justifies the ring-fencing of parameter SLPBT  (scheme 1). It seems reasonable 
to expect that an average number of legal problems of those that only recently 
have acquired knowledge of the access privilege will be transitionally higher than 
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that of those that regularly benefit from legal aid, .SLPB  The latter, in turn, 
ought to be higher than the number of legal problems articulated and solved 
free of charge by those that benefit from both legal aid and commercial advice, 
.SLPBK  One then can expect the following inequality to hold:
.SLPBK SLPB SLPBT< <  (10)
The increased demand on the side of the new payees just made conscious 
of their privilege should be of transitory character, until the outstanding matters 
of theirs are fully cleared, whereas the next ones will be served online. Em-
pirical verification of the afore-mentioned hypothesis consists in identifying 
the relationship between the number of legal problems declared by the payee 
and the time span the payee has been aware of the access privilege. Such a re-
lationship should be a decreasing function of time. In the long-run a conver-
gence takes place ,SLPBT SLPB®  which means a short-term demand will be 
higher than the long-run demand due to the dam failure effect.
2. Variant of high demand and poor legal aid infrastructure (sparse net of legal 
aid clinics). This variant differs from the previous one with respect to the le-
gal aid infrastructure, whereas the other parameters are the same. Under 
such circumstances LUS  remains unchanged, just like in (9), but:
' 11 11 12
,
maxBPPD A SLPBT B SLPB C SLPB C SLPBK
D SLPBK
= × + × + × + ×
+ ×  (11)
' 11 13 22 11
12 13 2 .
maxSPOT A SLPBT A A B SLPB C SLPB
C SLPBK C SLPK C SLPK D SLPBK
= × + + + × + ×
+ × + × + × + ×  (12)
3. Variants of demand lower than the maximum one seem obviously more re-
alistic because they do not assume payees’ full awareness of access privilege 
and nil mobility or time costs related to reaching appropriate legal aid clinic. 







realisticBPPD w A SLPBT w w A SLPBT
w A SLPBT B SLPB w C SLPB
w C SLPBK D SLPBK
= × + ×










12 13 2 ,
realisticSPOT w A SLPBT w w A SLPBT A
w A SLPBT A B SLPB w C SLPB
w C SLPBK w C SLPK w C SLPK D SLPBK
= × + × +
+ × + + × + ×
× × ×
× ×
× × ×+ × + × + × + ×  (14)
1 31 2 1 2 ,realisticLUS w A A B w C C D= + +× ×+ + +  (15)
where all the weights satisfy the following condition:
0 1, 1,2,3.iw i< < =  (16)
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Weights 1w  and 2w  are assigned to changes (increase) in awareness of access 
privilege in the wake of the reform. Their differentiation follows types of payees, 
A  and C  in scheme 1. Type C  payees are determined in their quest for solution 
to their problems since they take advantage of commercial service. Their com-
mitment should then translate into more rapid learning of the access privilege. 
Consequently, one can expect the following inequality to hold:
1 30 1.w w< < <  (17)
Weight 2w  refers to the actual opportunity to get legal aid under aware-
ness of access privilege (types A12 and A21 in scheme 1). The assumption made 
in variant 1) of maximum demand could be found realistic only if legal aid pro-
viders in person paid home visits to the payees, not the other way round. In 
turn, in variant 2 (sparse net of legal aid clinics, 2 0w = ) an implicit assump-
tion is present that introduction of the reform will not result in actual increase 
in accessibility of legal aid clinics ( 2 0w = ), which seems counterproductive. In 
effect, a much more realistic variant is the one, in which an increase in the num-
ber of legal aid clinics will lead to a better actual accessibility of legal services. 
Operationally, this means 20 1,w< <  whereas the denser the net of legal aid 
clinics is, the closer the value of weight 2w  is to unity.
It is hardly possible to estimate the above weights on the basis of available 
data. One can only benefit from experience of other countries that monitored 
the demand for legal aid by the above-depicted criteria, before and after the in-
troduction of a suitable reform of legal aid. Yet, a unique opportunity to assess 
changes in the actual awareness in response to the way a reform is supposed to be 
introduced (no publicity versus intentional and mass publicity) can give a pilot 
introduction of the reform solutions on a local scale, e.g. in two socio-econom-
ically up-close counties. Providing one knows the demand and the necessary 
operationalization parameters shown in scheme 1, one can adequately accom-
plish this task.
By the same token, one can analyze how the density of legal aid clinics af-
fects the actual demand. Under similar socio-economic conditions present 
in two counties, only one new aid clinic could be settled in one of them, whereas 
some more in the other, all other things — such as relative number of providers, 
terms of serving legal aid, publicity, etc. — remaining the same.
A lot of invaluable information in the area under consideration can be 
collected by means of a national questionnaire in which  — apart from other 
pertinent questions — there was one concerning the respondent’s place of res-
idence. Only then would it be possible to incorporate objective data on so-
cio-economic conditions of a given administration unit that are highly relevant 
in the context of demand determinants for legal aid. This kind of information 
would enable estimation of individual components of identities (2) and (3) by 
means of cross-sectional or even multi-level econometric models. After all, it 
is not only individual factors (age, education, income, gender, etc.) but also 
  EKONOMIA I PRAWO. ECONOMICS AND LAW, 15(3): 317–334
327
meso- and macro-level ecological and institutional variables (local/regional 
wages, population density, economic inequalities, production structure, unem-
ployment rate, etc.) that affect the demand (Gramatnikov et al., 2010; Access 
to Justice Taskforce, Attorney-General’s Department, 2009). Besides, it would 
be possible to estimate the demand size by regional layout, which is of crucial 
practical importance to suitably befit supply in view of the fact that macro-scale 
equilibrium does not by itself guarantee local-scale equilibria.
3.4. Demand under heterogeneity of payees and legal aid
Assuming heterogeneity of payees and of legal advice the aggregate demand for 
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symbols of variables given in formula (2);
1,...,i K=   — number of eligible groups distinguished by appropriate 
criteria;
1,...,j M=  — number of types of legal advice.
Accounting for inherent heterogeneity of payees and legal advice is obviously 
a more apt description of reality. Yet, on theoretical grounds it does not contrib-
ute much but, as can be deduced comparing formula (18) with (2), it yields a lot 
of technical problems5.
4. The methodology of the research with respect to efficient 
supply of legal aid under fixed demand
Efficient of supply of legal aid can be accomplished by means of the so called as-
signment problem (Wagner, 1980), which warrants minimization of aggregate 
costs of realization of a particular economic purpose in the framework of some 
constraint and boundary conditions. It is this operational research procedure 
that seems most apt to balance supply with the pre-determined demand for legal 
aid under the operationalization presented in section 3. The optimal solution is 
obtained using the Simplex algorithm (Wagner, 1980).
Certain modifications of the assignment problem enable incorporation 
of other cost problems — such as e.g. fixed or minimal proportions of legal aid 
5 The scale of the possible problems illustrates the decomposition presented in scheme 
1. Introduction of heterogeneous types of payees would result in the necessity to further 
decompose the relevant parameters into all respective types of payees. Accomplishing this 
goal would only be possible if there was available an appropriately extensive data base cov-
ering all the relevant operationalization items presented in the article.
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providers by type or some mark-up costs — making the whole operationaliza-
tion correspond to the investigated reality. Finally, what emerges is the optimal 
number and structure of providers by type, which clears up the ‘market’ of legal 
aid under minimal social costs.
Let there be R-types of providers: 1,...,r R=  (distinguished by experience 
and/or professional specialization). The providers serve M-types of legal advice: 
1,...,j M=  (the same layout as in formula (18)). Depending on their formal 
education, knowledge and experience they differ in their productivities that 
in turn depend on a given type of legal advice.
Let:
jrf   — average productivity of the r-th provider in solving the j-th legal 
problem; it is about the number of specific legal problems a given pro-
vider can settle within a given period of time (say in a year) if they dealt 
only with cases of one type.
One has to note that so defined productivities do not take into account aver-
age wages of providers by type. Yet, this information is crucial since it is the sum 
of wages of all individual providers that makes up the aggregate costs of legal aid 
provision.
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or put differently:
11 1 12 2 13 3 1 1
21 1 22 2 23 3 2 2
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rN  — number of the r-th providers: 1,..., ;r R=
jL  — number of the j-th type legal advice: 1,2,..., ;j M=
rwage  — average wages of the r-th type provider.
Decision variable is the number of providers by type, whereas the aggregate 
costs of legal aid provision are subject to minimization. Data necessary to oper-
ationalize the concept are as follows:
 – types of legal advice ( 1,...,j M= ); typology must be in line with formula 
(18);
 – types of providers ( 1,...,r R= );
 – average wages of the providers by type;
 – average productivity of the r-th provider in solving the j-th legal problem,
.jrf
The average wages by providers are unknown but they can be established 
on the basis of appropriate information from the commercial legal advice mar-
ket, where wages of a given type of provider — say a barrister — can be treated 
as a point of reference. It is about the following relationship:
,/r r Brel sal sal=  (22)
where:
1,...,r R=  — types of providers;
rrel   — relation of average wages of the r-th type provider over average 
wages of the reference provider;
rsal   — average wages of the r-th type provider (established on the basis 
of commercial legal advice market);
Bsal  — average wages of the reference provider.
For the reference category we get:
/ 1.B B Brel sal sal= =  (23)
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Relation (22) narrows the question of arbitrariness in establishing average 
wages of providers only to a discretionary decision concerning Bwage  because 
the remaining items will be computed as follows:
.r r Bwage rel wage×=  (24)
Basing the above calculus on market data discards any arbitrariness while 
assigning administrative wages to a particular provider because, once having 
discretionally determined wages for the reference group, the other wages will 
be set in an effective manner.
There remains an open question how to fix the wages of the reference group, 
Bwage  Apparently the following relation should hold:
,B Bwage sal£  (25)
since there are no economic premises for legal aid providers to earn more than 
their commercial colleagues6. All in all, however, the question of establish-
ing wages for the reference group must be subjected to a judgmental, political 
decision.
Introduction of an institutionalized system of legal aid might result in a de-
crease of demand for commercial advice. Consequently, the commercial agents 
should participate in the provision of legal aid to get compensated for the loss. 
Yet, following the rule of general efficiency it is advisable for the providers to be 
recruited from non-commercial circles of lawyers. The institutionalized system 
of legal aid should affect as little as possible the existent commercial market 
of commercial services (see footnote 5).
The key issue for the whole operationalization of the assignment problem 
given by formula (19)–(21) is determination of jrf  productivities. To accomplish 
6 It appears logical to set =B Bwage sal  (which means equalizing the voucher price 
to the market rate) and boil down the whole reform to a voucher system, where payees 
would be given certain legal aid vouchers to be redeemed in the already existent private legal 
offices. Yet, there seems to be at least one strong economic counterargument to such a solu-
tion, to say nothing of some others (like a possible emergence of a black voucher market). 
Namely, under quite inelastic supply — if it to be limited to the members of the Bar only — 
increasing demand for commercial legal advice (due to the introduction of the voucher sys-
tem) is sure to activate the law of supply and demand, with a consequent rise in the charges 
for commercial legal advice (Tata, 2007, pp. 489–519). This is bound to happen even if 
the providers are obliged to charge only appointed rates for the legal aid to the voucher cus-
tomers. In the short-run under fixed supply and fixed voucher rates, more demand is sure 
to result in higher charges to commercial customers. Finally, the providers — either aware 
or unaware of the original cause of this state of affairs — will lobby for a rise in voucher 
rates claiming that the existent ones lag far behind the market rates for similar services. 
Thus setting =B Bwage sal and providing legal aid only by the members of the Bar will exert 
a continual pressure upon increasing commercial and voucher rates in a long-going inter-
linked feedback. Moreover, it is hardly possible to determine how long the afore-men-
tioned process might last before a final equilibrium rate has been reached. Yet, such a rate 
is sure to be higher than the initially fixed one.
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this task it is necessary to know the productivities by subject ( 1,...,i M=  — 
types of problems) and by object ( 1, ...,j R=  — types of providers) criteria. It is 


























ijp  — average productivity (expressed e.g. in hours) of serving legal advice 
of the i-th type by the j-the type provider.
Below follows a stylized example. Let us assume we have four types of legal 
advice (proper verses in matrix (26)):
 – legal cases of low complexity,
 – legal cases of standard complexity,
 – legal cases of above standard complexity,
 – legal cases of unprecedented complexity.
Let us also assume there are three types of legal aid providers (proper col-
umns in matrix (26):
 – paralegal,
 – experienced lawyer,
 – expert in law.












ê ú= ê ú¥ê ú
ê ú¥ê úë û
Õ
 (27)
The matrix aptly grasps the mains issues7:
 – legal cases of low complexity (being closer to a piece of information rather 
than a piece of actual advice) can be settled by each provider fast and ready 
(here assumed 0.5 hour) but along with growing complexity there grows 
7 The presented operationalization assumes that average labor intensity of a given piece 
of legal advice depends solely on its complexity, being independent of a given law subject. 
Yet, if to make an apparently more realistic assumption that the complexity differs on av-
erage also with respect to law subject, then such a modification does not add qualitatively 
to the analysis, making it only more bulky. E.g. let us assume that there are 5 types of legal 
advice, each of which with 4 stages of complexity, and finally — three types of providers 
(just like in the stylized example). Then, the size of matrix (27) grows fivefold, from 
´P4 3  
to 
´P20 3 . By the same token, introducing more differentiated types of legal aid providers 
would result in similar effects.
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time necessary to solve the case, too, in a different manner accordingly 
to a particular provider;
 – some cases cannot be solved by lawyers with general knowledge and experi-
ence and that is why there are symbols of infinity (¥ ) in matrix (27).
5. Conclusion
The concept presented in the paper can be further extended and specified more 
precisely. On the demand side the extension can follow the general scheme 
described in formula (18), whereas on the supply side  — some guidelines 
in the second paragraph of section 4. All the categories and parameters used 
in the conceptualization, if operationalized, call for quite precise legal specifi-
cations. Yet, realization of this task is country, institutional and data specific so 
that it is virtually very difficult to be a priori concrete in this field. Obviously, 
gathering appropriate and reliable data of all the parameters needful to run rel-
evant computations is a challenge by itself but as such it has not been tackled 
in the paper. The whole approach, supplemented by estimates of existent costs 
of non-institutionalized legal aid in Poland (Florczak, 2016, pp. 68–85), as well 
as rough estimates of its reform (Florczak, 2015, pp. 189–206), might outline 
necessary scientific steps to be taken towards making the whole system effective.
The presented model of balancing supply with the predetermined demand, 
including the decomposition of main components affecting the demand that en-
ables general estimation of future demand following a specific formula of the re-
form introduction seems the first attempt of its kind. The very idea of the model 
seems applicable also in other areas where services are provided free of charge.
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Decomposition of all declared legal aid cases on the side of payees
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SLPB — average number of visits to a legal clinic per payee benefiting only from legal aid;
SLPBK — average number of visits to a legal clinic per payee who additionally benefits from commercial 
advice;
SLPBT — expected number of legal problems per payee with a newly acquired knowledge of access 
privilege (dam failure effect);
SLPK — average number of visits to a commercial legal office per payee (those who benefit only from 
commercial advice despite being entitled to legal aid).
Source: own preparation.
